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When Carnap wrote a short intellectual autobiography for Marcel Boll in March 1933, he 
mentioned two things about Prague: (1) that he became a professor at the German University 
in 1931, and (2) that he worked on his Logische Syntax der Sprache until 1933.2 These things 
are well known. Carnap spent, however, five long years in Prague, just like he did before in 
Vienna: so, one might ask, whether (1) and (2) indeed sufficiently characterize his Prague-
period. Philipp Frank (1949, 45), who was there for almost twenty years when Carnap arrived, 
wrote that “[f]rom 1931 on we [i.e. Frank and Carnap] had in this way a new center of 
‘scientific world conception’ at the University of Prague.” This seems to be much more than 
what Carnap claimed. 
 Actually Carnap might have had great expectations regarding Prague: the First 
Conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, where the Vienna Circle made public 
its manifesto, was organized by Frank there in 1929; five years later in 1934 the Preliminary 
Conference of the International Congresses for the Unity of Science was hosted again in 
Prague. As Jan Sebestik (1994, 205) claimed, “Prague has always been one of the important 
European centres of learning and of science, and it has often been the forerunner of vast 
currents or movements, both intellectual and political.” The city also had a long tradition of 
scientifically oriented philosophical thinking: through Bernard Bolzano, members of the 
Brentano-School (such as Anton Marty, Tomáš G. Masaryk, Christian von Ehrenfels, Hugo 
Bergmann, Oskar Kraus), via Ernst Mach (who was the Rector of the University before it was 
divided into a Czech and a German part), to Philipp Frank and Albert Einstein, the field was 
well-prepared for Carnap. What else could one wish for? 
 Things might be not that simple, however. Was Frank right, for example, when he 
claimed that he and Carnap built a ‘new center of scientific world conception’? The aim of 
this paper is to provide historical evidence and further materials to approximate this question. 
Definite answers, however, require more space and contextualization, so I will just sketch 
some partial but hopefully promising narratives and rudimentary answers. I claim that though 
Carnap and Frank indeed tried to build up a new center, they were unsuccessful, and possibly 
there were many reasons for this. This is the general claim; regarding Carnap, I will also show 
his way to the German University and his philosophical, scholarly, and cultural life in Prague. 
                                                          
1 This paper was supported by the MTA BTK Lendület Morals and Science Research Group, by the János Bolyai 
Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and by the “Empiricism and atomism in the 
twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy” NKFI project (124970). I am indebted to the Carnap Archives at  
Los Angeles (Rudolf Carnap papers (Collection 1029). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young 
Research Library) and at Pittsburgh (Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905-1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections 
Department, University of Pittsburgh), and to the Wiener Kreis Archiv (Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, 
Haarlem, The Netherlands) for the permission to quote the archive materials as “MSN” for the Moritz Schlick 
and “ONN” for the Otto Neurath Nachlass. All rights reserved. Translations from the archive files are mine. I am 
indebted to Christian Damböck, Brigitte Parakenings, and Christian Damböck for their corrections and 
comments. 
2 “Lebenslauf [für M. Boll; 6.3.33.]” (RC 011-20-09, p. 2). This biographical note was written presumably for 
the French edition of Carnap’s “Die alte und die neue Logik,” published in 1933 as L’Ancienne at la Nouvelle 
Logique, Paris, Hermann & Cie. The volume was translated by Ernest Vouillemin and Marcel Boll wrote an 
introduction. Marcel Boll (1886-1971), originally a physicist and engineer, was a French positivist philosopher 
and scientist, who translated many papers and booklets of the Vienna Circle into French. On Boll and logical 
empiricism, see Schöttler 2015. 
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2. The Long Struggle for a Chair (1926-1931) 
After Carnap defended his doctoral dissertation in 1921, he became an independent scholar, 
traveling around the world from Europe to the United States and Mexico. He did not have a 
permanent academic position, though he certainly would have accepted one.3 
 On August 9, 1924, Schlick wrote to Carnap that he knows about his plans to 
habilitate in Vienna. Schlick happily encouraged the young Carnap and the habilitation came 
with the possibility of becoming a Privatdozent at the University of Vienna, that is, being 
qualified for becoming a professor at a later point. However, already in January 1926, Carnap 
noted to Schlick that Frank wrote him about the prospects of creating a brand new position in 
Prague, but until everything is worked out, which could be a while, he should go with the 
Vienna job.4 So even before Carnap was appointed to Vienna, he knew about Prague and 
could have been excited about that. But a long and interesting road was ahead of him until the 
end of 1931. 
 Carnap was not the only candidate for Prague. In April 1925, Reichenbach wrote to 
Schlick that he had to abandon his Stuttgart position (which he had since 1920) and that he 
aims to go to Berlin with the help of Max Planck and Albert Einstein.5 As it turned out 
quickly, Reichenbach faced some serious and sneaking problems in Berlin: some people 
(Reichenbach named Heinrich Maier) were trying to dump on him because of his leftist socio-
political activities from 1914.6 Since Planck himself did not oppose the charges but agreed 
with them in principle, Reichenbach was quite afraid that he couldn’t ensure his existence in 
Berlin.7 In this unfortunate and insecure situation came a letter from Schlick in January 1926 
that a certain “Lehrstuhl für Naturphilosophie”, a professorship is planned in Prague. 
Reichenbach already knew about this, since Frank wrote him as well: he was grateful and 
happy for the possibility and was willing to go to Prague! Furthermore, Schlick indicated to 
Reichenbach that he will be the first candidate and Carnap the second!8 
 Carnap – being only a Privatdozent in Vienna – and Reichenbach – getting, after all, a 
position as außerordentlicher Professor (associate professor) in Berlin – were invited by 
Frank to meet personally in Prague and discuss their possibilities in 1926.9 Carnap got to 
know Frank on November 5, 1926, when he stopped by on his way from Berlin to Vienna. A 
month later he held two lectures in Prague, followed by lively discussions (with some 
controversies of course), and Frank ensured Carnap a few days later that the lectures made a 
“good impression”.10 
 Months and actually years were gone, and nothing happened (except, presumably, 
behind the scenes)! While Carnap never indicated any skepticism about Prague, Reichenbach 
had his ups and downs about his future prospects. Carnap noted in his diaries on April 16, 
1927, that Reichenbach does not consider a job in Berlin (since he was working there already, 
he might have had in mind a tenure-like professorship) and he wants to go to Prague. He 
wrote to Schlick, however, in June 1928, that even after he heard that things will be pressed 
now in Prague, he does not have any hope after being on the waiting list for 2,5 years. That 
time Reichenbach wanted to go to Frankfurt where the neo-Kantian Hans Cornelius and the 
phenomenologist Max Scheler were to retire and Ernst Cassirer would have suggested 
                                                          
3 Various periods of Carnap’s life during the 1920s are considered in the papers of Damböck (ed.) 2016.  
4 Carnap to Schlick, January 15, 1926 (RC 029-32-28). 
5 Reichenbach to Schlick, April 22, 1925 (MSN). 
6 On Reichenbach’s involvement in the German Youth Movement and his political affairs, see Padovani 2013, 
Kamlah 2013 and Damböck 2018. 
7 Reichenbach to Schlick, August 10, 1925 (MSN). 
8 Schlick to Reichenbach, January 16, 1926 and Reichenbach to Schlick, January 24, 1926 (MSN). 
9 See Reichenbach to Schlick, December 6, 1926 (MSN). 
10 Carnap’s diary entry, December 13, 1926. 
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Reichenbach for one of the chairs; so Reichenbach indicated to Schlick that in such a case 
Carnap should get the Prague job (though he is still only the second on the job-list).11 
 Two years later, in 1930, replying to Schlick, Reichenbach wrote that the Prague-case 
is still not decided: though he wants to go there, there are financial issues.12 In October 1931, 
now six years after the beginnings and first letters, Schlick wrote that he hopes that 
Reichenbach is not sorrowful because of Prague and that Carnap will have a nice time there.13 
In response, Reichenbach claimed that he is actually quite sad about the Prague job, but he 
had to decline the offer! He had no choice, as he said, since he had to take care of the 
existence of his family and this was not made possible by the economic situation in Prague.14 
Though there are no details in the letter, we find some hints in Carnap’s correspondence. But 
the point is made: Carnap was only second and thus he was able to go to Prague because 
Reichenbach declined their offer, he was not chosen as the first candidate!15 
 Carnap got a letter from Prague on June 19, 1930: as his diary entry indicates from the 
next day, it was about some special terms (Bedingungen) that Neurath suggested to accept: 
Carnap would become a professor extraordinarius with the title of a professor ordinarius. The 
decision was made quite hard for him since on June 21, 1930 “Schlick telephoned: title of 
professor in the faculty has been accepted (39 against 5).”16 So Carnap became a professor in 
Vienna! In August, he met Reichenbach and they talked about Prague. The latter said that 
Frank and Heinrich Freiherr Rausch von Traubenberg, professor of physics in Prague, were 
not inclined to create a professor ordinarius position, because they want a second position in 
mathematics. Reichenbach seemed to suggest Carnap to accept temporarily the non-ordinarius 
position with the condition that it will be later transformed into an ordinarius one.17 
 On September 2, 1930, Carnap went to Prague and met in the Ministry Dr. František 
Havelka, and the “Prodekan” and plant physiologist Ernst Pringsheim to discuss the issues 
concerning the new job. Frank indicated that Traubenberg was impatient because the 
negotiations with Reichenbach were too long: they indicated that Carnap has to decide 
quickly.18 It is not known from the documents when did Carnap accept the job-offer with their 
conditions, but he got to know in August 1931 that he was appointed already on June 30, 
though it did not become legally valid [rechtskräftig]; it still wasn’t in late October, when he 
started to teach, or in December, when he wrote his first longer report about Prague.19 He was 
just an assistant (Supplent), not a professor, even in the next semester, in March 1932:20 that 
meant that his salary was quite reduced. The ministry told Carnap in 1932 that everything was 
in order and only translational things were to be done; he was skeptical though, and with good 
reasons! He noted in his diaries that when he came back to Prague from the 1935 Paris 
Congress, Dr. Havelka claimed, “the promotion to Ordinarius has a good chance, but the 
earliest date is January [1936].”21 Since Carnap left Prague in December 1935, he never 
became actually a professor ordinarius there. 
                                                          
11 Reichenbach to Schlick, July 23, 1928 (MSN). 
12 Schlick to Reichenbach, June 8, 1930; Reichenbach to Schlick, June 11, 1930 (MSN). 
13 Schlick to Reichenbach, October 23, 1931 (MSN) 
14 Reichenbach to Schlick, November 16, 1931 (MSN). 
15 It might be interesting to note that according to Feigl (1969/1981, 61), for the Viennese position that Carnap 
got in 1926, Reichenbach was the other candidate, but Hans Hahn persuaded others to get Carnap because Hahn, 
“a great admirer not only of Mach but more especially of Russell, was convinced that Carnap would carry out in 
detail what was presented merely as a program in some of Russell’s epistemological writings.” 
16 Carnap’s diary entries for June 19, 20, 21, 1930. 
17 Carnap’s diary entry, August 10, 1930. 
18 Carnap’s diary entries, September 2 and 4, 1930. 
19 Carnap to Schlick, December 7, 1931 (RC 029-29-15). 
20 Carnap to Schlick, March 2, 1932 (MSN). 
21 Carnap’s diary entry, October 2, 1935. 
5 
 What conclusions and observations shall we draw from these data? (1) During the 
1920s, Reichenbach was much more respected and wanted in philosophical circles than 
Carnap: until 1926, Reichenbach published two monographs (Relativitätstheorie und 
Erkenntnis apriori, 1920; Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre, 1924), his doctoral 
dissertation in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik (1915) and more than 
twenty articles, mainly in physical journals. On the other hand, Carnap published his doctoral 
dissertation and two articles in Kant-Studien, another paper in Annalen der Philosophie und 
philosophischen Kritik, and finally a short monograph about Physikalische Begriffsbildung 
(1926).  Hence, even if Reichenbach’s wider recognition is understandable, we have now also 
some more evidence about its effects as well. 
 (2) The considerations in this section about Carnap’s struggle also suggest that he did 
not simply continue his philosophical career and projects in Prague after Vienna, but was 
quite lucky that he had lower requirements and existential needs than Reichenbach, and that 
the latter declined an offer he actually really wanted to take. It would be a quite interesting 
counterfactual history, especially for the history of philosophy of physics, namely, what 
would have happened if Reichenbach joins Frank in Prague already around 1928 when he was 
just about to publish his Philosophy der Raum-Zeit-Lehre. 
 
3. Carnap in Prague 
With regard to Carnap’s Prague-time, I will discuss shortly three components of this period: 
his lectures, his philosophical works, and cultural life. 
 
3.1. Carnap’s Lectures 
Let’s start with the list of Carnap’s lectures (Vorlesungen and Seminare) that he had, after his 
inaugural lecture on “The Task of the Philosophical Foundation of Natural Science”,22 
between the 1931 and 1935 winter semesters. 
 
1931 WS [= Wintersemester]23 
(1) Naturphilosophi[sche Strömungen der Gegenwart] 
(2) Grundlagen der Arithmetik 
1932 SS [= Sommersemester] 
(1) Einführung [in die wissenschaftliche Philosophie] (UCLA 03 – CM10) [4] 
(2) Grundlagen der Geometrie (RC 089-62-02) [Ina + 3] 
1932 WS 
(1) Logik I. (lots of participants, in the bigger lecture-room) 
(2) System der Wissenschaften: Eine Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie (RC 089-61-01) 
1933 SS 
(1) Logik II. 
(2) Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie der Neuzeit (RC 085-66-02) 
1933 WS 
(1) Naturphilosophi[sche Strömungen der Gegenwart] [44!] 
(2) Grundlagen der Arithmetik [14; Ina + 2 later] 
1934 SS 
(1) Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Philosophie [6] 
(2) Grundlagen der Geometrie 
1934 WS 
(1) Naturphilosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart [5-6] 
(2) Mengenlehre (RC 085-04-02, in shorthand) 
1935 SS 
(1) Logik I. [6] 
(2) System der Wissenschaften: Eine Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie[10] 
                                                          
22 Carnap to Schlick, December 7, 1931 (RC 029-29-15). 
23 At German-speaking universities, “Wintersemester” usually covers the period between early October and late 
March, while the “Sommersemester” covers early April to late September. 
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1935 WS 
(1) Logik II. [5, then 2] 
(2) Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie der Neuzeit (RC 085-66-01; 085-66-02) 
 
What can be seen from this list? First of all, the depressingly low number of students is 
telling. Carnap marked with an exclamation mark the 44 participants of the 
Naturphilosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart lecture in the 1933 winter semester. Though 
he did not give a number in the diaries, he emphasized the fact of the numerous participants of 
the Logik I lecture in the 1932 winter semester. All the other lectures and seminars were 
rarely attended. The typical entries in the diaries about these lectures registered an average of 
5 students, though usually, Ina was one of them. 
 What is even more striking is the comparison of Prague to Vienna: in his circular letter 
(Rundbrief), Carnap noted that he has the same Einführung in die wissenschaftliche 
Philosophie course that he had already in Vienna for years. The only difference is that while 
14 students attended it in Prague, he had 150 “registered participants” in Vienna.24 But as he 
noted in his diaries, with time, that 14 became occasionally just 4. Since these numbers did 
not change in any positive manner during his five years stay in Prague, Carnap noted the 
inclination of the students to participate at his courses with sadness, bitterness and at times 
anger. 
 We would have a clearer picture if we were to know the exact number of students 
enrolled at the universities in Prague and Vienna. It is quite possible that the number of 
students at Carnap’s courses in Prague in relation to the number of students at the University 
is not that depressing after all and we should put a different weight on the numbers above. 
Nonetheless, what matters now is Carnap’s own perspective and he experienced the situation 
quite sadly: even if the ratio of his students to the students enrolled at the University was 
promising, working now with 5 students instead of talking to 150 might came as a loss of 
prestige in his perspective. 
 Some of Carnap’s lecture notes are preserved in shorthand, transcript or typed forms. 
Instead of going through them individually, I just note that Carnap had such lectures that were 
connected somehow to his research, and did not start ahead anything entirely new. While this 
might not be surprising, it also points to the fact that we should look into Carnap’s work 
outside the seminar rooms. 
 
3.2. The Thursday Colloquium(s) 
In 1999, Gereon Wolters wrote a quite pessimistic paper about logical empiricists’ philosophy 
of biology: he claimed that logical empiricists did not have any proper, deep, or relevant 
philosophy of biology since wrong people asked the wrong questions in their wrong (highly 
ideological) frameworks. 
 In 2015, Wolters gave a talk, actually a refined and revised version of his 1999 paper. 
Though the general outlook of the new one is the same, Wolters noted the important efforts of 
(at least some) logical empiricists to deepen their knowledge in the philosophy of biology. By 
discussing the Prague “Vorkonferenz” with the Paris/Copenhagen Congresses, Wolters (2018) 
argues that “[…] from ‘Prague’, via ‘Paris’ to ‘Copenhagen’ we see a sort of positive gradient 
as to special problems in the philosophy of biology: It goes from zero in Prague via old 
questions in Paris to information about actual biological science, inviting philosophical 
analysis in Copenhagen.” In order to facilitate his arguments and points, Wolters recalls some 
lectures of a Colloquium, organized by Frank and Carnap at Prague in 1935. Actually, this is 
the only reference to Carnap and Frank’s Colloquium in the literature that I am aware of. 
                                                          
24 Carnap’s circular letter, March 2 1932 (RC 102-67-01), Cf. Iven (2015, 134-135). 
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 Before I discuss this Colloquium, I have to note that actually, the cooperation of 
Carnap and Frank dates back to as early as 1932.25 In one of his first report-letters about 
Prague, Carnap wrote to Schlick on March 2, 1932, that he “started a Thursday-night-circle 
[Donnerstagabendzirkel] with Frank.” We do not have much information about this group: 
Carnap wrote that there were especially many Russians and followers of the Brentano-school, 
who are capable of discussing problems rationally and deliberately. In the letter, we found 
that their issue was Carnap’s (1932/1959) “Metaphysics” paper, presumably the 
“Überwindung” one that was published already.26 
 The “first session” of the Circle (called by Carnap in the diaries as “our Circle”) was 
on January 14, 1932 at Frank’s place, with the following participants: Ina Carnap, the Russian 
Georg Katkov and Walter Engel, both of whom belonged to the third-generation of the 
Brentano-school; Sergius Hessen, a Russian philosopher and educationalist, one of the 
founders and editors of the international journal Logos and a neo-Kantian dialectician by 
education. Another participant was presumably Felix Weltsch, a close friend of Franz Kafka, 
and a well-known organizer of Jewish life in Bohemia, having two doctorates, one in law and 
one in philosophy. Finally, there was Karl Reach, a student of Carnap who attended many of 
his lectures and is known for a paper on the name relations and logical antinomies published 
in The Journal of Symbolic Logic (1938). Carnap noted that while Katkov and Weltsch 
understood well his points, Hessen did not get much of it; unfortunately, the latter led the 
discussion, “debating violently.”27 
 According to the diaries, the Circle did not work out well since it had only three more 
sessions. On January 21, they had an “interesting” meeting: the mathematician, Karl Löwner, 
who became worldwide known later at Stanford as “Charles Loewner”, was also there and 
made “clear remarks” but that is all that we know. One week later (January 28) Carnap noted 
a “Colloquium” with discussion about syntax without any further information about the 
details. Finally, again one week later, on February 4, Carnap became “impatient with 
Hessen”, even though Frank tried to mediate between them: Carnap explained that he does 
not think anymore that it is possible for them to understand each other.28 Since nothing is 
indicated in Carnap’s diaries or letters about the Circle, a Colloquium, or about regular 
meetings and discussions, seemingly Hessen’s temperament and incomprehension have 
brought the First Prague Circle to an end. 
 A few years of silence were ahead of Carnap and Frank on this front. After Carnap’s 
lectures in London, the appearance of Logische Syntax der Sprache and the famous pre-
conference, Carnap noted in his diaries in November 1934 that Frank wants to talk about the 
logical problems of quantum mechanics with others: besides discussing special questions of 
matrix operations and various formulations of the theory, Frank meant that “this would be a 
good test for the fruitfulness of scientific logic [wissenschaftliche Logik].”29 A few months 
later, on February 9, 1935, Carnap wrote that “Frank by us. Plans for a Colloquium.”30 And 
indeed that is what they did. A month later came the first session. The group was called 
“Colloquium for the Philosophical Foundations of Natural Sciences.” As the theme of the 
1935 summer semester, they choose the questions of “Physics and Biology.” 
                                                          
25 There is no indication yet of Frank’s having an own circle without Carnap, or before Carnap’s arrival. Since 
most of Frank’s paper from this period have been destroyed or lost, we have to rely on secondary materials, but 
none of them suggested so far that Frank would have organized anything; quite the contrary, as we will see. 
26 Carnap to Schlick, March 2, 1932 (MSN). 
27 Carnap’s diary entry, January 14, 1932. On the Brentano-school see the essays in Kriegel 2017; on the life and 
works of Hessen see Hans 1950. 
28 Carnap’s diary entry, February. 4, 1932. 
29 Carnap’s diary entry, November 30, 1934. 
30 Carnap’s diary entry, February 9, 1935. 
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 Frank, as the first speaker, talked on March 18 about “what do the new theories of 
physics mean for boundary questions of physics and biology?” Among the discussants we 
find, for example, Joseph Gicklhorn who was, first of all, a biologist, with an interest in the 
human sciences and history; in February 1931, before Carnap went to Prague, Gicklhorn held 
a lecture in the Verein Ernst Mach about cell physics.31 Another participant was Johannes 
Paul Fortner, a zoologist; Reinhold Fürth, who was an experimental physicist, studying with 
and working next to Frank for almost fifteen years;32 Ludwig Berwald, professor of 
mathematics, working on geometry; and Karl Löwner. 
 According to Carnap’s diaries, there were eight more meetings. One week later 
(March 25) Frank talked again, but this time Ernst Pringsheim was also there with Kostja 
Zetkin, a German physician, social economist, and lover of Rosa Luxemburg. Zetkin, after 
fleeing from Moscow, worked as a physician in Prague between 1935 and 1938. 
 At the next meeting (April 1), Gicklhorn presented a lecture: the new participants were 
Trude Schmidl-Waehner, an Austrian painter, and the Viennese biologist Felix Mainx, who 
wrote later about the Foundations of Biology for the International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science. A certain Dr. Keller and Hans Zeisel were there as well: the latter was a sociologist 
and legal scholar from Vienna whose memoirs of Carnap were published posthumously 
(Zeisel 1993). 
 At another session (May 13) Pringsheim talked about whether “biology has its own 
laws”; as Carnap noted in the diaries, he criticized different things in the presentation with 
Frank and Fürth. The fifth occasion was Carnap’s lecture (May 27): “The relation between 
biology and physics, from the viewpoint of the logic of science”. As it was claimed in the 
diaries, Pringsheim and Adolf Pascher, director of the Institute of Botany, were sympathetic 
to the presentation, while “Gicklhorn thought, ‘too much physics’”. 
 The next two meetings (June 6 and 10) were just mentioned in the diaries, but nothing 
was said about them. The final two occasions, held in the next semester, were devoted to 
Mainx (who talked about genetics, November 11) and to Fürth (“Are the physical processes 
continuous or discontinuous?”, December 2). The lecture was followed by a discussion about 
probability and wave function between Carnap, Frank, Fürth and presumably Paul Hertz, a 
German philosopher of science and physicist, who was emigrating from Nazism first to 
Switzerland, then to Prague. (Hertz was actually the co-editor of Helmholtz’s (1921/1977) 
epistemological papers with Schlick.) 
 What follows from these considerations? (1) There were only a few scholars who 
attended the small number of meetings; these scholars were indeed working on biology and 
physics, so the group could fulfill its task of investigating the relations between physics and 
biology. This could also support Wolter’s claim that this group was initiated to get a closer 
look at (the philosophy of) biology. Frank (1936) indeed gave a talk on the relation of physics 
to biology at the 1935 Paris Congress; one year later at the Second Congress in Copenhagen 
the topic was “The Problem of Causality – With Special Consideration of Physics and 
Biology.”33 
 (2) What is also salient is the wide range of intellectuals, attending the Circle: painter, 
physician, physicist, biologist, mathematician, sociologist, zoologist, and botanist. It would be 
again a piece of counterfactual history-writing to imagine what would have happened if 
Carnap and Frank have more time and energy. But before we would be too optimistic or 
sentimental, note that in 1935 Neurath asked Carnap in a letter whether something came out 
of the colloquium and anyone could deliver a talk at the forthcoming Paris congress. Carnap 
                                                          
31 Carnap’s diary entry, February 18, 1931. 
32 Fürth (1965) gives some impressions about his Prague time with Frank.  
33 On the congress see Stadler 2001/2015, 178-182. Frank’s and logical empiricists’ philosophy of biology is 
taken up in Hofer 2002 and 2013. 
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said in his reply that unfortunately only Frank and he would be able to do that; he also 
mentioned Gicklhorn but claimed that he could not emphasize well the theoretical questions 
of the logic of science.34 
 Considering the fact that next year Carnap emigrated to the United States, and two 
years later Frank followed him, one might plausibly claim that the discussion group was not 
able to achieve anything similar to the Vienna Circle and Frank could not build a functioning 
school or center with Carnap in Prague.35 
 Discussion groups and circles were quite regular, however, in Prague (similarly as 
they were in Vienna): both cities presented a certain “culture of circles”. Prague had its own 
Philosophy Circle (Cercle philosophique de Prague), directed by such pupils of Edmund 
Husserl as Ludwig Landgrebe and Jan Patoćka. After Husserl became their honorary member 
in May 1935, he delivered a lecture in November about “The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Psychology”. Carnap noted in his diaries that he did not attend Husserl’s lecture, though it 
attracted Felix Kaufmann from Vienna.36 Besides the Philosophy Circle, there was a linguistic 
circle (more on below), and the Brentano Association, hosting the Brentano Nachlass. These 
groups, associations and circles, having numerous members and sympathizers, were not 
entirely hostile to logical empiricism, though they expressed more criticism than support. 
 Actually, neither Frank, nor Carnap could function as the “big locomotive” of the 
alleged “new center in Prague”, thus they were not able to develop any unified or 
recognizable brand. If Carnap and Frank had any recognition in Prague, they had it through 
Vienna’s Vienna Circle.37 
 
3.3. Carnap’s Philosophical Life 
Carnap (1963a, 33) said in his famous intellectual autobiography that “[m]y life in Prague, 
without the [Vienna] Circle, was more solitary than it had been in Vienna. I used most of my 
time for concentrated work, especially on the book on logical syntax.” According to the 
diaries, Carnap indeed spent most of his time and energy on the syntax manuscript. He 
worked, however, in relative isolation: he was invited to the Linguistic Circle of Prague by 
Roman Jakobson only in February 1935, and he delivered a talk about “Logische Syntax der 
Sprache” three months later, so only after the publication of the Syntax book.38 There is no 
evidence of any earlier direct contacts between Carnap and the structural linguists of Prague, 
though their circle was very similar to the Vienna Circle: they even had their own journal and 
manifesto from 1929 to propagate their modernist worldview.39 Carnap was more active, 
however, in the Mathematical Circle (Mathematisches Kränzchen), where he presented three 
lectures (one on Hilbert, another on Gödel, and one about general axiomatics) and attended 
many others.40 
                                                          
34 Neurath to Carnap, May 11, 1935 (RC 029-09-55) and Carnap to Neurath, May 15, 1935 (RC 029-09-54).  
35 While seemingly the discussion group on physics and biology did not have a major impact on Carnap as a 
philosopher of physics and biology, Uljana Feest and Thomas Mormann argue further in the present volume that 
Carnap was unsuccessful also as a philosopher of psychology. 
36 Carnap’s diary entry, November 15 and 16, 1935. 
37 It should be mentioned, however, that many philosophers visited Prague during these years: W. V. O. Quine, 
Alfred Tarski, and Carl G. Hempel, just to name a few. Nonetheless, these scholars went there especially 
because of Carnap and not because of an internationally well-recognized school or center, as it often happened in 
the case of the Viennese Vienna Circle. 
38 See Carnap’s diary entries, February 11 and May 20, 1935. 
39 On Prague’s linguistic circle, see Broekman 1974. 
40 See Carnap’s diary entries, January 15, 22, February 5, November 25 1932 and January 19, 1934.  
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 But Logische Syntax was not the only publication of Carnap during his Prague period, 
and so the question arises, what was Carnap working on, and whether we could detect any 
special influence on his thought that emerged particularly during the Prague-time?41 
 Some of the most famous papers that appeared around 1931 and 1932 were written 
before Carnap moved to Prague. Among these, we find “Überwindung der Metaphysik”, the 
“Die Physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache,” and the “Psychologie in physikalischer 
Sprache”. Though Carnap’s response to Edgar Zilsel and Karl Duncker were written in 
Prague, it was composed in the first months (his “Protokollsätze” paper a bit later), so nothing 
particularly influential could be detected there. 
 Besides some reviews, there is nothing from 1933. Among the publications from 1934, 
we find “On the Character of Philosophic Problems,” which was written especially for 
“America” and is based on Carnap’s Swedish and Danish lectures from 1932 and 1933.42 
Obviously, there is the Syntax book, some minor writings on pragmatism, mathematics, but 
also his volume for Neurath’s Einheitswissenschaft, the English translation of his 
“Physikalische Sprache” paper, and the lesser-known “Theoretische Fragen und praktische 
Entscheidungen.” The latter ends with an interesting passage, claiming that metaphysics has 
no theoretical content, thus cannot be refuted in the strict sense, but can be studied  
 
[…] through investigations of a sociologist and a psychologist; one can determine, for example, that it is 
here a matter of wish fulfillment and similar things, whose systematic advancement and diffusion in 
social struggle serves as a diversion and a smoke screen. 
 In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should here be remarked that we are not speaking here of a 
conscious goal but rather of the factual social function, which in the main does not come into the 
consciousness of the practitioners but is rather hidden by a justifying ideology. (Carnap 1934, 259-260.) 
 
This passage might sound as Carnap has learnt the lessons of Frank about the sociological 
determination of theories and metaphysical ideas. But “ideology” as some form of “false 
consciousness” is much closer to Neurath than to Frank: the latter’s 1932 book on causation 
did not consider explicitly the question of ideologies and even later, Frank’s concept was 
related rather to Karl Mannheim and Robert Merton than to Marx. Nevertheless, Carnap’s 
diaries testify that he was aware of the Marxist notion of ideology through various lectures, 
reading groups, usually advocated by Neurath, and also spoke often with the Marxist Walter 
Hollitscher.43 
 In 1935, Carnap published his London-lectures as “Philosophy and Logical Syntax,” a 
paper on psychology and the philosophy of mind in French (presented at a Paris symposium 
on psychology and the natural sciences), another mathematical passage that was cut from 
Syntax, and his 1934 Prague Vorkonferenz paper, “Formalwissenschaft und 
Realwissenschaft”. 
 Again, what do these publications show to us? Carnap was working indeed on his 
Syntax book, and many of his publications were related to that project. Though he noted later 
                                                          
41 It should be mentioned, though, that there is a file in the Carnap Archive at Los Angeles (UCLA 03 – CM10), 
entitled “Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Philosophie,” on which Carnap worked for years (seemingly 
between 1929 and early 1931) before his Prague-time. Besides a few pages of something like an analytic table of 
contents for two volumes, the file consists mainly of 150 pages of shorthand notes. Some of which are dated as 
“November 1931,” so presumably was using this material for teaching the “Einführung” course in Prague as 
well. The text is a sort of introduction into scientific philosophy, summarizing the main issue of the early 1930s: 
overcoming metaphysics, foundations of the special sciences (empirical and formal as well); the first volume 
was titled as “The Language of Science,” while the second as “The Foundations of the Sciences.” I am grateful 
to Christian Damböck for calling my attention to this file. 
42 See Carnap’s diary, November 14, 16, 18, 1932 and June 24, 1933. 
43 See for example the diary entries from May 12, 1930; April 18, 1931 and January 2, 1934. Note that the first 
entry dates before his departure to Prague. 
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that he has learnt a lot from Frank about the philosophy of physics, he did not present 
anything particularly relevant about that in his publications – neither about the philosophy of 
biology. While Logical Syntax has a few passages about these questions, they are quite 
general and optimistic regarding the project of unified science. Nevertheless, though these 
discussions with Frank and in their circle(s) did not surface in his writings, Carnap might have 
been motivated in his unified science conception that emerged later with renewed force in the 
Encyclopedia. 
 With regard actual philosophical works, Carnap (1963a, 39) complained that while in 
Vienna he could talk at least with the members of the Circle, in Prague he “had even fewer 
opportunities for discussions with philosophers,” since he belonged to the Faculty of the 
Natural Sciences and not to the Humanities. (As Frank (1949, 45) noted, it was through 
Tomáš G. Masaryk – an influential philosopher, sociologist and the first President of the new 
Czechoslovakia after World War I – that the Faculty of Sciences created a professorship for 
natural philosophy.44) But there are some indications that the Faculty of Natural Sciences had 
some previous relations to philosophy. Frank (1947, 77-78) noted in his Einstein biography, 
that the life goal of the famous physicists Anton Lampa – who brought Einstein and Frank to 
Prague – was to “propagate Mach’s views and to win adherents for them.” Though Lampa left 
Prague for Vienna in 1918, his influence on the scientific community is unaccounted so far 
and, on the other hand, with Frank’s appointment, disseminating the ideas of Mach was 
continued. Therefore, before World War I (and possibly even after it), Mach’s philosophy was 
still prevailing among natural scientists – it wasn’t necessary thus that Carnap could not talk 
about philosophy at his Faculty. 
Nevertheless, as soon as his Vorlesungen and Seminare were over, Carnap got on the 
train and lectured around Europe, seeking out old and new connections. Going through Berlin 
(talking at Reichenbach’s seminar and lecturing on the radio), he went to Copenhagen, 
Göteborg and Stockholm (1932), later to Bratislava and Brünn (1934). Next year he visited 
Münster to meet Heinrich Scholz and talk about the philosophy of mathematics. These 
various presentations picked up the questions of the nature of philosophy (which he called in 
Brünn as the “opium of the intelligentsia”), of soul and god (a related lecture was published 
recently by Thomas Mormann, see Carnap 1929/2004), and of the natural and human 
sciences. While he talked in Prague about “the way of scientific philosophy” in the Urania 
(Prague’s German Society which aimed at communicating scientific results to a broader 
public), he also touched upon the “sociological function of metaphysics in the present” at the 
Society of Socialist Academics. There might be some connections to Frank – given that this 
was one of the latter’s most favored topics during his entire career – but the talk is not 
preserved, unfortunately. 
 Regarding the line of personal influences, we must strictly distinguish the Carnap-
Frank and Frank-Carnap routes. Frank’s The Law of Causality and its Limits (1932/1998), 
published in 1932, contains general references to Carnap occasionally, mainly with regard to 
his investigations into the connection of metaphysics to realism. This is not at all surprising: 
Carnap’s (1928/2005) general ideas (documented in his Aufbau and Scheinprobleme) were 
known quite generally that time and his books were reviewed well, even by, for example, 
Felix Kaufmann, a peripheral member of the Circle. The lack of detailed considerations of 
Carnap’s ideas, however, is also understandable: though Frank finished his book when Carnap 
arrived in Prague, he was working on the book already around 1925.45 In the Preface, Frank 
acknowledged and expressed his gratitude for the help of physicists (Albert Einstein, Richard 
                                                          
44 On Masaryk’s life and works, considering his relation to (logical) positivism as well, see Tulechov 2011. 
45 Schlick to Reichenbach, August 5, 1925 (MSN). 
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von Mises, Ernst Schrödinger), of biologists (Josef Gicklhorn and Fritz Knoll),46 of 
sociologists (Neurath), but not to philosophers and not to Carnap. 
 A few years later, however, Carnap became quite effective in moving Frank into new 
directions. After the appearance of the Syntax-book, Frank often referred explicitly to 
Carnap’s book (1938/1949, 86; 1936/1949, 162; 1938/1953, 220-221) and to the logic of 
science (1934/1949, 124). This does not mean that Frank started to pursue logical and 
syntactical inquiries: but his remarks show the signs of Carnap’s influence. Frank admitted 
the legitimacy of Carnap’s approach: he even planned a lecture, about ‘logical syntax and 
physics’ for the 1938 Cambridge congress, but canceled it;47 furthermore, he tried to integrate 
that type of investigation into a more general philosophy of science, what was called recently 
by Thomas Uebel (2012) as the “bipartite metatheory”. 
 Regarding the Frank-Carnap line, note first that Frank was significantly honored 
among logical empiricists and other circles as well. (Though this may not be obvious in the 
Circle’s published writings, the correspondences of the individual members testify this.) 
Many of Frank’s papers were translated into French, as soon as they were published in 
German, just like his pamphlet – entitled “The Fall of Mechanistic Physics” (Frank 
1936/1987) – that was written for Neurath’s Einheitswissenschaft. This booklet, though it is 
not mentioned in Frank’s bibliography (in Frank 1932/1998, 290-296), was translated into 
Czech after its publication (Frank 1937). 
 Therefore one might expect some direct and significant influences here. Even though 
Carnap and Frank met regularly when they were in town at the same time (actually this did 
not happen very often), Fürth (1965, xiv) claimed that “[Frank] preferred to work on his own 
and never had a ‘research school.’” But this does not mean that Frank’s work did not have any 
impact on Carnap’s thoughts. Carnap (1963a, 32) claimed, for example, in his intellectual 
autobiography that “in a way similar to Neurath, [Frank] often brought the abstract discussion 
among the logicians back to the considerations of concrete situations. […] I received many 
fruitful ideas from my talks with him, especially on the foundation of physics.” 
 Frank indeed had some slight effect on Carnap: he noted in his An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science that according to Frank, “it is often instructive to read the prefaces of 
scientific textbooks” (1966/1995, 206). Though Carnap discussed an example of how the 
sentence “nature never violates the laws” documents extra-scientific tendencies, he did not 
provide details or context, only admitted the legitimacy of such inquiries. 
 But that book of Carnap, which is rarely discussed besides its considerations on 
scientific realism and instrumentalism, might contain some surprises. Carnap presents there 
his ideas on many important notions of philosophy of science, and devotes some space to 
quantum physics as well. Since he was a trained theoretical physician, he had a good position 
to write about such issues, but the truth is, he wrote to Wolfgang Yourgrau in 1958, that he is 
not that familiar with quantum mechanics since during his education he learnt about the 
theory of relativity, and later he turned towards mathematics and not followed the newest 
debates in and about physics.48 Thus it would be important to contrast what Carnap says in 
this book about physics and what Frank wrote during the 1930s to see whether there is any 
line of influence there. Again, before we become too optimistic, note that Carnap claimed in 
his diaries, that just a few days before he left Prague, he was able to tell Frank, after waiting 
                                                          
46 Knoll was an Austrian botanist who became professor in Prague after 1922 and later in Vienna (1933). He was 
also a member of the NSDAP and was known later for his national socialist views. According to the diaries, 
Carnap met Knoll once in Prague on December 12, 1926. 
47 Frank to Neurath, June 1938, Fiche 62/237 (ONN). 
48 Carnap to Wolfgang Yourgrau, October 3, 1958 (RC 027-42-03). Actually, Carnap mentioned this also in his 
intellectual autobiography (1963a, 14-15), where he claimed that Reichenbach used to help him in physical 
questions and in turn he helped Reichenbach in logical problems. 
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for four years, an idea about the gravitational field. This does not sound like a well-balanced 
relation between them.49 
 Carnap knew well Frank’s major work: after the appearance of The Law of Causality, 
he (1933, 275) quickly reviewed it in Kant-Studien. His remarks are not very interesting in 
themselves: he does not criticize the book or picks up any particular point to develop further. 
He notices the conceptual crisis of physics and appreciates Frank for his exact and clear 
formulations, for his inclination to write for the laymen, and calls the book as the “best 
contemporary presentation of the causality-problem.” He also emphasized that Frank does not 
admit any philosophy beyond the sciences as a separate higher discipline. 
 Though the review is quite regular, Carnap and Frank were obviously approaching 
philosophy, science, their nature and function from the same ground and they reached very 
similar conclusions. Nonetheless, the abovementioned “bipartite metatheory conception” was 
lurking around that time. Carnap wrote in Logische Syntax that theory of science “in addition 
to the logic of science, includes also the empirical investigations of scientific activity, such as 
historical, sociological, and, above all, psychological inquiries” (1934/1937, 279). Frank’s 
book contained many interesting chapters on the historical and sociological conditions of 
scientific, especially physical and philosophical theories, a fact acknowledged and stressed in 
Carnap’s review as well.50 Nevertheless, Carnap was either a philosophically minded 
physicist and logician or a philosopher trained in the natural sciences, he certainly was not a 
sociologist of science. As he said (1963b, 868) later: “unfortunately a division of labor was 
necessary, and therefore I am compelled to leave the detailed work in this direction [the 
analysis of the social and cultural roots of philosophical movements] to philosophically 
interested sociologists and sociologically trained philosophers.” 
 
3.4. Carnap’s Personal and Cultural Life 
It is known from the original manuscript of his intellectual autobiography, that Carnap 
“missed painfully” that spirit and attitude in Vienna, which he encountered in the German 
Youth Movement. “Although [Carnap] was able to play a leading role in the philosophical 
work of the [Vienna Circle, he] was unable to fulfill the task of a missionary or a prophet.” 
The United States is also mentioned: he faced similar troubles there, but nothing is said about 
Prague.51 Presumably, this is not accidental. Carnap was leading no one there: as we saw, he 
did not have a secured circle or group of regular students and he was not a public intellectual 
or cultural organizer. 
  It is also possible that Prague offered more possibilities when Frank started to work 
there: for example, around 1911 and 1912, the house of Berta Fanta provided the place for the 
so-called Fanta-Kreis (it is also known as “Café Louvre” after its first residence). Fanta was a 
well-known Jewish intellectual figure in the life of Prague, who was much interested in 
German and Czech literature, science, and arts, organizing thus a forum for the cosmopolitan 
elite outside the academic curriculum. Prague’s most prominent scientists and artists attended 
the meetings, which took place before World War I: Albert Einstein, Christian von Ehrenfels, 
Oskar Kraus, Franz Kafka, Max Brod, Rudolf Steiner, Hugo Bergmann, and Gerhard 
Kowalewski. They talked mainly about philosophy, religion, but there were also musical 
performances. According to many sources, Frank attended these meetings as well.52 
 Nevertheless, Berta Fanta died after World War I, and her circle was not continued, 
though presumably, something like that would have kept Carnap busy as well. Though it 
                                                          
49 Carnap’s diary entry, December 7, 1935. 
50 On Frank’s sociology of science, see Uebel 2000 and Tuboly 2017. 
51 Carnap, 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, folder M-A5, pp. B35-B36. 
52 See Wein 2016, 54;  Smith 1981, 141. n.9.; Pawel 1984, 145. See also the autobiography of Gerhard 
Kowalewski (1950). 
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should be mentioned that Carnap could have withdrawn from cultural life given the newly 
emerged unsupportive atmosphere of the 1930s. In the section on “Values and Practical 
Decisions” of his Library of Living Philosophers volume, Carnap (1963a, 82) described how 
Oskar Kraus, the famous Brentano-scholar of Prague, “seriously pondered the question 
whether it was not his duty to call on the state authorities to put [him] in jail.” 
 Carnap claimed in the early 1930s that ethical, normative and other types of value 
statements do not have any theoretical or cognitive content, empirically and intersubjectively 
approachable by factual scientific investigations. They were meaningless given a very 
restrictive sense of “meaning” and Carnap always made this explicit. He (1963a, 81) also 
admitted that these sentences have “emotive or motivating [components and meaning], and 
their effect in education, admonition, political appeal, etc., is based on these components.” 
Nevertheless Carnap was criticized by different persons, who “ascribed to the problem of the 
logical nature of value statements an exaggerated practical significance” (ibid.). They said 
that by not having theoretical, thus demonstrable content and validity, value statements lost 
their true interpretation and this conception leads to immorality and nihilism. As it turned out, 
Kraus had this problem with Carnap’s conception at his seminar and after that he aimed at 
bringing this issue to higher authorities in 1935.53 
 When Kraus and Carnap met personally, they were able to find a common ground: it 
turned out that Carnap was not a “wicked man” and he developed a “very high respect for 
[Kraus’] sincerity and absolute honesty in philosophical discussions, and his kindness and 
warmheartedness had a great personal appeal” (1963a, 82).54 
 From Carnap’s personal life one thing should be mentioned. Carnap and Ina’s civil 
ceremony was on March 5, 1933 and the Frank’s were their legal witnesses. I quote Isreal 
Scheffler who described Carnap’s wedding and Frank’s role in it as follows: 
 
[Frank served] as a witness at the wedding ceremony of Rudolf Carnap and his wife. The ceremony was 
conducted in Czech, which Carnap did not understand. Frank therefore acted as translator as well as legal 
witness. He had to convey the official’s questions to Carnap in German, and then translate his answers 
into Czech for the official to meet the formal requirements of the rite. When the procedure began, Carnap, 
the meticulous logician and philosopher of language, asked Frank to clarify the meaning of the verbal 
formulas required. As the procedure continued, Carnap kept interjecting questions as to the logical status 
of the particular statements he was expected to supply at each juncture. Frank finally interrupted him, 
saying, in effect, “Do you want to get married or not? If so, just answer and don’t ask questions!” 
(Scheffler 2004, 66.) 
 
Carnap wrote to Schlick that the ceremony was insignificant for them:55 they were living 
together for many years, and the marriage played presumably more of a pragmatic role with 
regard to future traveling, for example. Nevertheless asking the Franks as their legal witnesses 
may point towards that Carnap’s cultural and personal life in Prague was mainly concentrated 
around the Franks: Philipp Frank often translated Russian movies for the Carnaps in the 
cinema, and the Carnaps often visited the Franks, even when Philipp was out of town.  
 
4. Conclusion: On the Road Again 
                                                          
53 Kraus presumably had an even deeper problem with logical empiricists. Herbert Feigl (1969, 7) told the 
following story later: in 1920, when Einstein was again in Prague to hold a lecture, Kraus debated him “with 
great excitement,” arguing for the synthetic a priori conception of absolute space, which was rejected by (most) 
logical empiricists. 
54 In a letter to Neurath, however, Carnap described the resolution as he met Kraus accidentally at Frank’s house 
and Kraus admitted that their debate had cultural risk and talked it over. Carnap to Neurath, April 11-12, 1935 
(RC 029-09-61).  
55 Carnap to Schlick, March 5, 1933 (RC 029-28-31). 
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After 1933, given its general liberal atmosphere and its German-speaking university, Prague 
became somewhat of a center for German emigrants, and for many others from the Balkan 
and from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this paradise of diverging opinions and people was 
questioned already in 1934 when Carnap noted in his diaries that he asked Frank whether they 
should make a demonstration with the Prague biologist and philosopher of science Emanuel 
Rádl (1873-1942) and other professors against nationalism. While Frank agreed in principle, 
he thought that only a few people would join them.56 The issue behind the demonstration was 
presumably the question of where to place the insignia of the university. After the university 
was divided into a German and a Czech University in 1882, they shared certain institutes, 
libraries, and, among others, the old insignia of 1338 that was kept in the German University. 
While Czech politicians required the insignia to be kept at the Czech University, their protests 
became more violent in the 1930s. On November 21, 1934 students of the German University 
had to hand over the regalia to the Czech part of the University. A few days later both 
German and Czech students became involved in the debate, the latter, outnumbering the 
German students, tried to attack the German University, while the Germans resisted. Finally, 
the regalia were given to Czech University, but nationalistic voices were strengthening from 
days to days on both sides, harming the relations between the nations and the universities. 
 It was, however, the final straw. Carnap wanted to leave Prague even earlier: he aimed 
to find a Rockefeller fellowship, but it turned out in February 1934, that they did not have any 
philosophy position, and Carnap’s project was not exactly mathematical.57 The same thing 
happened as with his doctoral dissertation: he worked in a grey zone. A few months later, in 
August, when Charles Morris arrived to Prague, Carnap explained to him why he does not 
have any more chance in Middle-Europe. Morris could not promise anything regarding 
Chicago (he emphasized the Catholic tendencies of the department and that the chair wants 
Nicolai Hartmann), but he promised to look after Carnap’s case.58 
 Even before Morris could deliver any news, and right after Carnap found out that a 
lecture tour couldn’t be arranged for him in New York (though Ernest Nagel tried to help 
him), he was invited to Harvard’s 300th-anniversary conference to hold a lecture and to take 
his honorary doctoral degree! “A first step towards America,” he commented in the diaries.59 
A few months later, it turned out that Morris succeeded: Carnap was invited to the University 
of Chicago for the period January-March 1936.60 
 On December 12, 1935, Carnap went to Dresden, then to Bremen in order to sail to the 
United States. As his representative and successor, Carnap suggested at first Neurath (he 
thought, however, that Neurath would not be the best candidate for a position at the Natural 
Science Faculty), then Walter Dubislav, Edgar Zilsel, Carl Hempel, and the German 
philosopher Ernst von Aster, who emigrated next year to Turkey; against Reichenbach both 
Frank and him had “personal misgivings” and Popper was not sympathetic to Frank.61 As it is 
known, none of these figures got the job. 
 After Carnap went to the States, the situation did not get any better; actually it became 
worse on both sides of the ocean. In June 1936, Carnap wrote to Neurath that according to 
                                                          
56 Carnap’s diary entry, November 30, 1934. 
57 Carnap to Schlick, February 28, 1934 (RC 029-28-24). 
58 Carnap’s diary entry, August 17, 1934. The Thomist philosophers’ resistance to logical empiricists is 
documented in Reisch 2005 and 2017. 
59 Carnap’s diary entry, February 28. 1935. 
60 Carnap’s diary entry, August 5, 1935. On Carnap’s invitation to Harvard, and how he transformed his own 
philosophy at the Harvard conference approaching the American audience, see Damböck (forthcoming).  
61 Carnap’s diary entry, November 25, 1935. On the context and relevance of possible nominating Neurath for 
the Prague-position (especially with regard to the history and internationalization of logical empiricism), see 
Tuboly (manuscript). 
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Frank, “anti-Semitism in Prague is again flourishing”.62 Carnap thus tried to help Frank, to 
come to the United States, but this did not work out effectively in the mid-1930s. Frank had to 
wait two more years in Europe, and he was able to visit America only in late 1938 and never 
moved back to the old continent. More interestingly, however, Carnap commented that by 
saying: “The world is hoggishly arranged. Over here anti-Semitism is vast as well, especially 
at the Universities, – so for example, I heard that non-Aryans not even had the slightest 
chance to get the job at Princeton that I rejected.”63 Presumably, Carnap referred here to 
Reichenbach, who complaint to Louis Rougier that though Carnap recommended him for a 
Princeton job he was not able to take it because of an anti-Semitic trend there.64 
 It is quite well known how hard was it for emigrants in general to adapt to the new 
life-conditions, but it is less known, how it was for others, like Edgar Zilsel (who committed 
suicide), Felix Kaufmann, Alfred Tarski, Karl Menger, or Carl Hempel etc. It is a story to be 
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